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Abstract 
Children  will  comprehensively  copy  others’  actions  despite  manifest  perceptual  cues  
to their causal ineffectiveness. In Experiment 1 we demonstrate that children will 
overimitate in this way even when the arbitrary actions copied are used as part of a 
process to achieve an outcome for someone else. We subsequently show in 
Experiment 2 that children will omit arbitrary actions, but only if the actions are to 
achieve a clear, functional goal for a naïve adult. These findings highlight how readily 
children adopt what appear to be conventional behaviors, even when faced with a 
clear demonstration of their negligible  functional  value.  We  show  how  a  child’s  
strong, early-emerging propensity for overimitation reveals a sensitivity for ritualistic 
behavior. 
 
Keywords: social learning, overimitation, cultural transmission, ritual, normative 
behavior 
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1. Introduction 
Activities basic to our survival, such as eating, drinking, and courtship, vary 
remarkably from country to country, sometimes even from region to region. Such 
diversity arises from our drive to act in accordance with our social in-group. We are 
motivated to be like others and to act as others do so that they will like us (Lakin, 
Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008). Acting in accordance with our in-group enhances health 
and well-being while avoiding scorn and isolation (Jetten, Haslam, Haslam, & Dingle, 
2014). For example, eating in the same fashion as our group members may be as 
important as the act of eating itself. Herein lies a paradox: What if the pursuits of 
those  around  us  comprise  redundant  processes  that,  at  least  for  efficiency’s  sake,  we  
should ignore? Would we only focus on those actions having clear functional 
valence? Recent research suggests we would not. 
From  early  in  life  we  are  prone  to  copy  others’  use  of  objects  so  inclusively  
that we incorporate visibly, causally irrelevant actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, 
Young, & Keil, 2007; Nielsen, 2006).  This  tendency  to  ‘overimitate’  increases  with  age  
(Marsh, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2014; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007) and is 
prevalent in starkly contrasting cultural groups (Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & 
Whiten, in press; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). According to Lyons and colleagues 
(Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Lyons et al., 2007) children show this 
puzzling behavior because they are yet to develop a mature understanding of the 
connection between actions and their outcomes and hence interpret any demonstrated 
action as causally necessary. Contrasting with this perspective are accounts that see 
overimitation as something socially driven that children engage in despite being fully 
aware of the redundancy of any irrelevant actions employed. Proponents of the 
affiliation view (Nielsen, 2008; Nielsen, Moore, & Mohamedally, 2012; Nielsen, 
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Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008; Over & Carpenter, 2012, 2013) suggest overimitation 
arises from a human-specific tendency to copy as a way of showing others they are 
like them and in turn to be liked by them, whereas normativity accounts couch the 
replication of redundant actions as being viewed as part of a broader action sequence 
that, although causally irrelevant, are nevertheless an essential and obligatory part of 
the activity (Kenward, 2012; Kenward, Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Keupp, Behne, & 
Rakoczy, 2013). Regardless of their veracity, each of these perspectives overlook a 
fundamental aspect of human behavior.  
 As our ancestors emerged from the Middle Paleolithic, social group size began 
to increase from those typical of non-human apes and towards numbers 
commensurate with modern humans (Dunbar, 2003). With increasing group size came 
the possibility of cumulative culture (Muthukrishna, Shulman, Vasilescu, & Henrich, 
2014), generating the ever more sophisticated repertoires that have contributed 
crucially to our species remarkable success (Tomasello, 1999; Whiten, 2005). With 
population size increased, new necessities and problems arose, including issues 
related to co-operation, allocation of resources, and social living. The pressure to 
distinguish devoted in-group members from imposters or interlopers became 
increasingly important, as did the need to gain social acceptance, and avoid ostracism, 
from majority group members.  
 Actions we execute deliberately, meticulously and intentionally, can be highly 
informative. These actions, when costly (in terms of time, energy or physical 
endurance) reliably indicate commitment to in-group beliefs (Atran & Henrich, 2010; 
Henrich, 2009; Soler, 2012). When we willingly undergoing a costly initiation rite, 
like scarification, we lend greater credibility to our claim as a loyal tribe member than 
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vocal exhortations of the same (Sosis, Kress, & Boster, 2007). In our evolutionary 
past those relying on verbal instruction to learn the attitudes and behaviors leading to 
social approval would have likely been at far greater risk of manipulation, and hence 
of fitness disadvantage, than those who could critically evaluate words relative to 
actions (Henrich, 2009; Rossano, 2012). Ritualistic actions have thus played a critical 
role in the development of human society.  
 According to Rossano (2012) a number of behavioral steps are necessary for 
actions to become ritualized. Critical elements of a larger set of behaviors are isolated 
and become more restricted and stylized in their execution. Ritualized actions must 
also be executed in a prescribed manner, repeated to attract and hold attention, and the 
goals demoted such that the acts performed are ends unto themselves and are not 
necessarily associated with an instrumental outcome. Rossano explicitly states that 
these are also the features that define overimitation. Exhibiting overimitation can thus 
be seen in the  context  of  children’s  adaptive  inclination  to  adopt  ritualized  actions,  to  
do  something  because  “this  is  how  it  is  done  here”.   
To appear intentional, overimitation actions are typically communicated to 
children in a clear, deliberate manner. According to the theory of human pedagogy 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2009) children have a natural predisposition to learn actions 
modeled in this way, assuming relevant cultural information is being taught. 
Overimitation might therefore arise because children are responding to the cues of a 
person who they assume is teaching them something important, kind-relevant and 
generalizable (Hoehl, Zettersten, Schleihauf, Gratz, & Pauen, 2014). If children 
interpret the redundant actions employed in overimitation tasks as ritualized behavior, 
indicating  something  akin  to  “this  is  how  we  do  it  here”,  causally  redundant  actions  
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should still be reproduced when pedagogical demand characteristics are diluted. 
Experiment 1 tested this.  
Children first joined an experimenter (E1) who played with one of her 
‘favorite’  toys.  E1  subsequently  placed  the  toy  in  a  box  and  left  the  test  environment.  
A second experimenter (E2) entered, took the toy from the box, played with it then 
placed it in a new box, subsequently demonstrating how the box could be opened 
using causally irrelevant actions in the process. E1 then returned, looked in the 
original box, and exclaimed that she did not know where her toy had gone. The key 
here  is  how  children  chose  to  open  the  new  box  given:  (a)  it  is  ‘for’  a  naïve  adult  
rather  than  a  demonstrator  who  is  no  longer  present;;  and  (b)  E1’s  request  shifts  the  
focus of the task towards the outcome and away from the actions. We compared 
children’s  responses  to  a  standard  overimitation  situation  and  a  social  pressure  
condition where E2 remained in the test room when E1 returned to find her toy had 
been removed from the original box.  
If  children  interpret  E2’s  actions  in  a  ritualistic  manner and exhibit them to 
signal alignment with the experimenters as new social partners they should imitate the 
irrelevant actions when opening the box for E1, regardless of condition. Conversely, 
if they are primarily motivated to demonstrate to E2 that they have learned what has 
been taught to them, the irrelevant actions should be exhibited at the lowest rates 
when E2 is absent and the ostensible aim is to help E1. In contrast, the causally 
relevant actions should be replicated at equal rates across conditions as there is little 
reason to omit them given they are associated with bringing about the target outcome. 
2. EXPERIMENT 1 
2.1. Method 
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2.1.1. Participants 
In total, 49 children participated in this experiment. Four were excluded due to 
experimenter error, one for inattentiveness, and two for refusing to participate. A final 
sample of 42 children remained (26 males and 16 females) of four years of age (M = 
54 months, range = 48-59 months). We chose this age group as it spans a period when 
overimitation  has  become  an  established  part  of  young  children’s  behavioral  
repertoire. Studies of imitation in young children commonly employ cell sizes of 12 – 
15 children per condition (Flynn & Whiten, 2008; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). It was 
thus decided to cease data collection once 14 children had been tested in each 
condition. Participants were recruited from an existing pool of parents who had 
previously expressed interest in having their child take part in developmental 
research. Parents were contacted via a letter in the mail and by phone, and those 
interested in volunteering brought their children to the university for testing. The 
majority of the children participating were Caucasian and from middle-class 
socioeconomic backgrounds. Children were randomly assigned into one of three 
experimental conditions. All children were presented with a small gift and certificate 
of participation. 
 
2.1.2. Apparatus and test environment 
 Testing was carried out in a dedicated child-friendly test room of a university-
based child development research facility. The test room consisted of a play mat, a 
chair, a cushion for the child to sit on, a small couch for parents to sit on, and a black 
wooden screen to conceal the apparatuses before use. Sessions were videotaped using 
a camera mounted on a tripod positioned in the corner of the room.  
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Boxes. Four distinct boxes (see Table 1), each having a different color, design and 
opening mechanism were used throughout testing. Two were designated as Initial 
Location boxes (Blue Box and Purple Box) and children did not act on these at any 
time during the experiment; rather they were used as props for the task narrative. The 
Blue Box (15cm x 22cm x 15cm) was wooden and its hinged lid opened downwards 
like a trap door. Pulling a small knob fixed to the lid opened it. The Purple Box (21cm 
x 15cm x 10cm) had a rectangular base and a rounded lid, and could be opened by 
unlatching a metal clasp attached to the front and pushing the lid up. 
 The Changed Location boxes were acted on by the children. The Green 
Switch Box (19cm x 12cm x 6cm) was mounted on a wooden base (19cm x 36cm). 
Sliding a teddy bear-shaped knob located on the front of the box horizontally from 
left to right released a hidden, spring-loaded mechanism thereby opening the lid. The 
Wooden Box (30cm x 19cm x 10cm) was mounted on two wooden supports and 
pushing the lid up via two small metal loops fixed to the front could open its hinged 
lid. The order of presentation of the boxes was counterbalanced across trials. 
Tools. The Changed Location boxes were presented along with the following tools: 1) 
a 16cm yellow drumstick with rubber end; 2) a 19cm green wooden mallet; 3) a 20cm 
orange-colored dowel; and 4) a 35cm red-colored rectangular stick. The drumstick 
and wooden mallet were always presented with the Wooden Box, and the orange stick 
and red stick were always presented with the Green Switch Box. One tool from each 
pair was placed to the immediate left of the box and the other was placed to the 
immediate right, counterbalanced across boxes, conditions, and participants. 
Sequence of actions. Each of the two Changed Location boxes had a unique opening 
demonstration associated with it. Certain actions were  termed  ‘arbitrary’,  because  
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they served no causal function in terms of opening the box. Other actions were termed 
‘causally-related’,  because  the  action  itself  was  functionally  connected  to  opening  the  
box even though it was not the most efficient way to do so (that is, for each action, the 
outcome could be more efficiently achieved by hand). Opening demonstrations 
incorporated both arbitrary and causally-related actions, and involved the use of the 
tools associated with each box: 
 Wooden Box opening demonstration: Experimenter 2 deliberately chose one 
of the corresponding tools (green mallet or yellow drumstick) and picked it up by the 
handle end. She then placed the tool upside-down vertically onto the top of the box 
with the colored end making contact  with  the  lid.  The  tool’s  handle  was  then  used  as  a  
fulcrum to flip the tool from vertical to horizontal so that it touched the right side of 
the box lid, then the left side, then the right side again (arbitrary action). This was 
done in a slow, deliberate motion. Next, E2 turned the tool horizontally and slid one 
end between the metal hooks on the front of the box, using the tool to push the lid up 
on its hinges (causally-related action). 
Green Switch Box opening demonstration: Experimenter 2 picked up either 
the orange or red stick and used the tool to tap the top of the box three times (arbitrary 
action). The tool was then used to slide the opening mechanism from left to right, 
causing the box to open (causally-related action). 
Toys. In each condition, toys were counterbalanced across boxes and trials in order to 
guard against any behavior of the children being inadvertently linked to toy 
attractiveness. The toys were: 1) a red and yellow wooden castanet with a smiley face 
painted on its top, 2) a soft pink rubber toy chicken which produced flashing lights 
when bounced, and 3) a small bird finger puppet. 
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2.1.3. Procedure and conditions 
Upon arrival, the child and parent were escorted to a warm-up room, 
whereupon the parent was given a consent form to sign and provided with further 
information  concerning  the  child’s  participation  in  the  study.  Whilst  in  the  warm-up 
room, the child was given a variety of toys (unrelated to the task) to play with and 
time to settle into the test environment, and become familiar with both experimenters. 
Once this process was complete, the parent and child were ushered into the test room. 
Parents sat on a small couch near their child during the session. Children were 
allocated into one of the following three conditions: 
Helping – Demonstrator Absent: The general procedure was derived from a typical 
change of location false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The child was brought 
into the test room and directed to sit on a small cushion on a play mat. Experimenter 1 
(E1) sat facing the child and presented him/her with the first Initial Location box, 
which  was  closed  and  contained  a  toy.  E1  sat  across  from  the  child  and  said:  “I  have  
something  to  show  you,  look  what  I  have  in  here”.  E1  then  opened  the  box  and  
removed the toy. She proceeded to play briefly with the toy and communicated to the 
child  how  much  she  liked  it:  “This  is  my  favorite  toy!”  Next,  E1  said:  “I  have  to  go  
now,  but  I’m  going  to  leave  my  toy  in  this  box”.  She  then  placed  the  toy  back  into  the  
Initial Location box and closed it. As she opened the door and exited the room she 
turned  to  the  child  and  said,  “Oh!  It  looks  like  [E2’s  name]  is  coming!” 
Experimenter  2  (the  ‘demonstrator’)  entered  the  test  room,  sat  down  next  to  
the child, and proceeded to look inside the Initial Location box. She took out the toy 
and  said,  “Oh  look  at  this!  This  is  a  cool  toy!”  In  order  to  reduce  the  child’s  desire  to  
play with the toy and in turn lessen the likelihood that they would attempt to get it out 
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immediately for themselves, E2 offered  the  child  a  turn:  “Do  you  want  a  turn?”  If  the  
child said yes, the toy was given to him or her to play with for approximately 30-60 
seconds.  If  not,  the  experimenter  said,  “That’s  okay,  I’ll  have  a  turn  instead,”  and  she  
played with the toy briefly. Next, E2 took one of the Changed Location boxes (with 
its lid open) out from a large covered box positioned behind her and placed it, and the 
tools associated with it, onto the play mat. The tools were positioned on either side of 
the  box.  E2  said,  “I  have  to go and listen to something now, so I am just going to 
leave  the  toy  in  here”.  She  then  placed  the  toy  into  the  Changed  Location  box  and  
closed  the  lid  facing  away  from  the  child.  She  then  said:  “Oh!  Before  I  go,  I’d  better  
show you how to get the box open!”  E2  then  selected  one  of  the  two  tools  
(counterbalanced  across  participants  and  conditions),  and  said:  “Watch  me  carefully”.  
She then proceeded to demonstrate to the child how to reopen the box, including the 
arbitrary and causally-related actions previously outlined. E2 looked at the child 
before performing each action. After the last action was demonstrated E2 again closed 
the  box,  said,  “I’ll  show  you  one  more  time”,  and  repeated  the  opening  demonstration.  
After  the  final  demonstration  E2  said  “Okay,  now  I’ve  got  to  go  and  listen  to  my  
recorder,”  got  off  the  play  mat  and  left  the  test  room. 
E1 then re-entered the room, sat across from the child and looked 
unsuccessfully  for  the  toy  in  the  Initial  Location  box,  saying  to  the  child,  “Oh  where’s  
my toy? I thought  I  left  it  in  here!”  If  the  child  immediately  went  ahead  and  attempted  
to open the Changed Location Box, E1 said nothing further. If the child suggested 
(verbally or through pointing) to her that the toy was in the Changed Location Box, 
she  said,  “I’ve  never  seen  this  box  before.  Can  you  get  my  toy  for  me?”  and  slid  the  
box and tools toward the child. This dialogue was used to avoid communicating any 
expectation that the child directly copy what was shown by E2. Once the child opened 
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the box and retrieved the toy Trial 1 was concluded. In order to transition into Trial 2, 
E1  said  to  the  child:  “I’m  going  to  put  these  boxes  away  now  but  I’ve  got  something  
else  to  show  you,”  and  she  placed  both  the  Initial  Location  box  and  the  Changed  
Location box out of sight. She then got the second Initial Location box, opened it and 
took the toy out. From this point, the procedure was identical to Trial 1, except that 
the boxes and tools changed.  
Helping – Demonstrator Present: This condition was identical to the Helping – 
Demonstrator Absent condition, except that after demonstrating how to open the 
Changed  Location  Box,  and  saying  “Okay,  now  I’ve  got  to  go  and  listen  to  my  
recorder”,  E2  sat  on  a  chair  in  the  corner  of  the  room.  She  put  on  headphones  that  
were attached to a recording device, pressed a button, and remained in that position. 
This  was  done  to  evaluate  the  effect  of  social  pressure  on  children’s  behavior.  That  is,  
E2  remained  physically  present  and  could  observe  the  child’s  behavior  but  because  
she was ‘listening’  to  something  she  could  not  ‘hear’  the  subsequent  exchange  
between E1 and the child, thereby reducing any assumptions that she would help.  
Direct Demonstration: This condition was designed to incorporate the method of a 
standard overimitation procedure whilst maintaining as much conformity as possible 
to  the  study’s  general  method.  The  process  was  identical  to  that  of  the  Helping  – 
Demonstrator Absent condition, however after the opening demonstration E2 slid the 
Changed Location box and tools over to the child and prompted him or her to open 
the  box  by  saying:  “Now  it’s  your  turn.”  Once  the  child  successfully  opened  the  box,  
E2 then re-closed the box and left the test room as E1 returned.  
2.1.4. Coding 
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From  footage  recorded  during  testing,  coding  was  conducted  for  the  child’s  
behavior in the presence of Experimenter 1 for the Helping conditions and in the 
presence of Experimenter 2 for the Direct Demonstration condition. For each box 
children were scored according to whether or not they: 1) selected the same tool as the 
experimenter; 2) copied the arbitrary action; and 3) copied the causally related action. 
Combined across boxes, children could score between 0 and 2 on each measure (i.e., 
each is scored independently to create 3 Independent Variables). A second coder who 
was blind to the rationale and specific hypotheses of the experiment independently 
observed  and  coded  20%  of  the  sample.  Cohen’s  kappa  scores  for  all  scores  were  
above .85 on all measures, an excellent level of agreement. Disagreements were 
resolved by consensus. 
2.2. Results 
 Preliminary analyses showed that there was no effect of gender or 
demonstration order on any of the variables of interest. These are not considered 
further. With regard to tool choice, the vast majority of children followed the 
experimenter’s  selection  and there was no difference in this tendency across 
conditions, F(2, 39)=.04, ns, partial 2 = .002.  
 In terms of production of the arbitrary actions, children in the Helping –
Demonstrator Present (M=1.36, SD=.84), Helping – Demonstrator Absent (M=1.35, 
SD=.93) and Direct Demonstration (M=1.57, SD=.76) conditions all performed 
similarly, F(2, 39)=.30, ns, partial 2 = .02 (see Figure 1). Reflecting this, the 95% 
confidence intervals for the mean production of arbitrary actions show considerable 
overlap across Helping –Demonstrator Present [0.82, 1.89], Helping – Demonstrator 
Absent [0.87, 1.84] and Direct Demonstration [1.13, 2.01] conditions. 
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 In contrast, and contrary to expectation, there was a significant difference in 
production of the causally related action (using the tool to open the boxes) across 
conditions, F(2, 39)=5.06, p= .011, partial 2 = .21. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests 
indicated that children in the Direct Demonstration condition used the tool at higher 
rates (M=1.86, SD=.36) than children in the Helping – Demonstrator Present 
(M=1.14, SD=.77) and Helping – Demonstrator Absent (M=1.07, SD=.92) conditions, 
p=.013 and .006 respectively (see Figure 2). There was no difference between the 
latter two conditions. The 95% confidence intervals for the mean production of 
causally related actions for children in the Direct Demonstration condition [1.65, 
2.07] did not overlap with those for the Helping –Demonstrator Present [0.70, 1.59] 
and Helping – Demonstrator Absent [0.54, 1.60] conditions. Notably, across 
conditions 39 of 42 children opened both boxes, indicating that the task goal was 
sufficiently transparent and achievable (children who didn’t  use  the  tool  opened  the  
boxes by hand). 
2.3. Discussion 
 If children encode causally irrelevant actions as ritualistic, they should use them 
even when pursuing something functional for someone else. This is what we found. 
Indeed, children did so at comparable rates to those who had an adult directly pass 
them the test apparatus in a structured, pedagogical environment. Surprisingly, this 
pattern did not apply in the Direct Demonstration condition, where children were 
more likely to reproduce the causally related actions. The purpose of the causally 
related actions was clearly identifiable; they provided access to the hidden toy, 
whereas the arbitrary actions lacked any intuitive causal connection to the outcome. 
Adoption of the arbitrary actions suggests  children  take  ‘the  ritual  stance’,  attributing  
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a rationale of cultural convention for demonstrated actions rather than one based on 
the laws of physical causation (Legare & Souza, 2012, in press). As such, when taken 
out  of  the  ‘do-as-I-do’  pedagogical  environment  created  in  the  Direct  Demonstration  
condition, children could evaluate the actions in terms of their causal efficacy and use 
easier means (i.e., their hands). By this reasoning children do not bundle together 
sequences of actions that lead to a tangible outcome as being all ritualistic or all 
functional, but can section them from each other.  
 If this explanation has traction, that children encode arbitrary actions within a 
ritualistic framework, then arbitrary actions should be replicated irrespective of their 
position in the larger chain of actions. To test this, in Experiment 2 an adult modeled 
the arbitrary actions after the box was opened and hence after the functional goal of 
the demonstration had been achieved. To provide an even stronger test of the ritual 
stance argument, we included a condition in which the redundant actions were 
relocated to after the box had been opened while the aim remained, as per Experiment 
1, to retrieve a hidden  object  for  a  “naïve”  adult.   
3. EXPERIMENT 2 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants and new experimental conditions 
 Forty-four children participated in this experiment (20 male and 24 female) at 
four years of age (M = 52 months, range = 49-59 months). Recruitment, apparatus, 
general procedure used and coding scheme were all identical to Experiment 1. 
Children were assigned to one of the following three experimental conditions: 
Direct Demonstration: As per the Direct Demonstration condition of Experiment 1, 
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E1  first  played  with  her  ‘favorite  toy’  then  departed  having  placed  it  in  the Initial 
Location box. E2 entered, played with the toy, sharing it with the child, placed it in 
the Changed Location box then demonstrated to the child how to reopen it, including 
the arbitrary and causally-related actions previously outlined. After the last action was 
demonstrated  E2  again  closed  the  box,  said,  “I’ll  show  you  one  more  time”,  and  
repeated the opening demonstration. After the final demonstration E2 slid the 
Changed Location box and tools over to the child and prompted him or her to attempt 
to  open  the  box,  by  saying,  “Now  it’s  your  turn.”  Utilizing  two  experimenters  in  this  
way enabled direct comparison with Experiment 1. 
 Arbitrary Actions Displaced - Demonstration: This condition was identical to the 
Direct Demonstration Condition, except that the arbitrary actions were performed at 
the end of the sequence after the box had been opened. Thus, the demonstration order 
changed such that the model first picked up the target tool, used it to causally operate 
the  box’s  opening  mechanism,  and  then  after  the  box  was  open  and  the  hidden  object  
accessible she performed the arbitrary actions on the open box. In this condition the 
arbitrary actions can in no way be interpreted as contributing to the goal of opening 
the box. 
Arbitrary Actions Displaced - Helping: This condition was identical to the Helping – 
Demonstrator Absent condition of Experiment 1 except that the arbitrary actions were 
performed after the box had been opened.  
3.1.2. Coding 
Coding  was  conducted  from  footage  recorded  during  testing  for  the  child’s  behavior  
in the presence of Experimenter 1 for the Demonstrator Absent (Arbitrary Actions 
Displaced) condition and in the presence of Experimenter 2 for the Direct 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Demonstration conditions. As per Experiment 1, for each box children were scored 
according to whether or not they: 1) selected the same tool as the experimenter; 2) 
copied the arbitrary action; and 3) copied the causally related action. Children could 
score between 0 and 2 on each measure. 
3.2. Results 
With regard to tool choice, as with Experiment 1, the vast majority of children 
followed  the  experimenter’s  selection  and  there  was  no  difference  in  this  tendency  
across conditions, F(2, 41)=.19, ns, partial 2 = .009. Similarly, in terms of using the 
tool to open the boxes (causally related action), children in the Direct Demonstration 
(M=1.86, SD=.36), Arbitrary Actions Displaced - Demonstration (M=1.87, SD=.35) 
and Arbitrary Actions Displaced - Helping (M=1.73, SD=.47) conditions all 
performed close to ceiling, F(2, 41)=.53, ns, partial 2 = .03 (see Figure 2). 
Reflecting this, the 95% confidence intervals for the mean production of the causally 
related actions show considerable overlap across Direct Demonstration [1.65, 2.07], 
Arbitrary Actions Displaced - Demonstration [1.67, 2.06] and Arbitrary Actions 
Displaced - Helping [1.48, 1.99] conditions. 
 There was, however, a significant difference across conditions with regard to 
production of the arbitrary actions, F(2, 41)=5.03, p= .011, partial 2 = .20. Tukey 
HSD post-hoc tests revealed that children in the Direct Demonstration condition 
(M=1.79, SD=.43) produced significantly more arbitrary actions than those in the 
Arbitrary Actions Displaced - Helping condition (M=.87, SD=.99), p=.008, with 
children in the Arbitrary Actions Displaced - Demonstration condition falling 
between (M=1.23, SD=.80) but not being significantly different from either (see 
Figure 1). Reflecting this, the 95% confidence intervals for the Direct Demonstration 
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[1.54, 2.03] did not overlap those for the Arbitrary Actions Displaced - Helping [.32, 
1.42] condition, with the Arbitrary Actions Displaced - Demonstration [0.82, 1.71] 
condition lying in between. 
 Notably, children in the Demonstrator Absent (Arbitrary Actions Displaced) 
condition were exposed to the same demonstration as children in the Helping – 
Demonstrator Absent condition of Experiment 1, except that here E2 modeled the 
arbitrary actions after the box was opened. Although rates of reproduction were lower 
in Experiment 2 (MExperiment 1=1.36, SD=.93 vs. MExperiment 2=.87, SD=.99) there was 
no statistical difference between the two conditions, t(27)=1.37, ns.  
3.3 Discussion 
Any action performed once the goal of opening the box has been satisfied must be 
redundant.  Given  children’s  capacity  for  identifying  causally  necessary  actions  
(Kenward et al., 2011; Keupp et al., 2013) it is unlikely they would have failed to 
recognize this. Yet those who saw such demonstration replicated arbitrary actions at 
similar rates to children for whom the same actions were embedded in a sequence 
leading to the boxes being opened. This suggests that preschool children, when shown 
actions having no apparent purpose, interpret them as holding non-causal 
significance.  
 Highlighting that children do not blindly copy everything, in the Helping 
condition children produced the arbitrary actions at the lowest rate across 
Experiments. The tendency for children to reproduce intentionally acted but causally 
redundant actions was reduced only by placing them after the functional goal had 
been achieved and when  the  actions  were  performed  for  someone  else’s  benefit.  
Nevertheless, 6 of the15 children in the current Helping condition still reproduced the 
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causally irrelevant actions on both boxes. This distinct manipulation dampened the 
overimitation effect, but could not extinguish it. We believe this emphasizes how 
children appraise modeled actions in terms of both functional valence and normative 
value, and make judgments on the relative value of each. For example, two recent 
studies have documented how children are highly motivated to copy actions of a 
group over those of an individual, but not when the group actions are unsuccessful 
(Turner et al., 2014; Wilks et al., in press). Precisely what directs and motivates 
children to assign proportional weight to functional and normative actions is beyond 
the scope of the current work, but is clearly something future overimitation studies 
need to address. 
 Finally, unlike Experiment 1, children in the Arbitrary Actions Displaced - 
Helping condition used the tool to open the boxes (causally related action) at similar 
rates to those in the two Direct conditions. It is possible that the lower rate found in 
Experiment 1 was the outcome of a Type I error. Against this, the rates of object use 
were similar for both Helping conditions in Experiment 1 and were similar for the 
three Direct Imitation conditions across both experiments. The standout difference is 
the lower rate of object use in the two Helping conditions of Experiment 1. It may be 
that seeing the functional actions demonstrated first amplifies the likelihood they will 
be processed as causally necessary and less subject to cultural convention. Research is 
now needed to investigate this. 
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Actions are readily ritualized when they are executed in a prescribed and 
deliberate manner, repeated to attract and hold attention, and which demote the 
importance of the goals such that performance is not necessarily associated with the 
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achievement of some instrumental outcome (Legare & Herrmann, 2013; Rossano, 
2012). The arbitrary actions employed in the current experiments neatly map onto 
these criterion. We thus maintain their reproduction should be seen in the context of 
children’s  adaptive  inclination  for  tuning  into,  and for readily adopting, ritualized 
actions.  
 As previously noted, multiple interpretations of overimitation have emerged in 
recent years. The data from Experiment 2 provide further evidence that accounts 
attributing this behavior to immature causal understanding lack broad explanatory 
power. Children reproduced the redundant actions even when the box was open and 
the contents easily retrievable. To maintain that children are confused about the causal 
connection between these actions and the target outcome are either false (if the target 
outcome is viewed as getting the box open) or highly unlikely (if the target outcome is 
retrieval of the object).    
 In  this  context  it  is  important  to  consider  assertions  that  we  are  an  “ultra-social”  
species (Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007, p.1360). Like 
no other animal, we are motivated to bind ourselves to those around us. We do this by 
showing we are like others and behave in similar ways so as to be liked by them, and 
we follow and reinforce behavior we think makes us part of our perceived in-group; 
perhaps because we consider members of our in-group  to  be  ‘right’  and  we  want  to  
show them that we think this (Haslam & Reicher, 2012). Under this umbrella are 
arguments that overimitation emerges from a need for social affiliation (Nielsen & 
Blank, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2008; Over & Carpenter, 2012, 2013) or  as a normative 
act emerging through interpreting actions as essential parts of a bigger conventional, 
generic activity (Kenward, 2012; Kenward et al., 2011; Keupp et al., 2013). 
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Experiment 1 indicates that overimitation does not arise solely to develop affiliation 
with the demonstrating adult, as children still overimitated when she was not present, 
but this need not diminish the explanatory value of this perspective. Indeed, both 
affiliation and normativity drive us to do just as others do, and in this sense these 
accounts can be seen as complementary and intertwined; both contributing to our 
motivation to act ritualisticly.  
 Following what has become standard practice (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005; 
Keupp et al., 2013; Marsh, Pearson, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2013), here we treated only 
the replication of unnecessary steps (i.e., the ‘arbitrary’  actions) as overimitation. 
Given their heightened causal opacity relative to the arbitrary actions we chose the 
conservative  approach  of  not  treating  the  ‘causally-related’  actions  as  overimitative.  
But we could have as they constituted an inefficient approach to the task solution (as 
it is easier to use your hand to push the lid of the Wooden Box up and to slide the 
Green Switch Box mechanism, rather than using a tool as demonstrated) – indeed past 
studies have done exactly this, albeit with younger populations (Nielsen, 2006; 
Nielsen et al., 2008). Though not considered here, the manner or style in which an 
action is executed may also constitute overimitation (Hobson & Lee, 1999; Lyons, 
2009). This raises the issue of precisely how children identify actions as causally 
relevant elements of a given sequence and others as conventionally necessary yet 
causally irrelevant.  
 In Experiment 2 the arbitrary actions were situated after the boxes had been 
opened.  Similarly,  children  will  copy  an  adult’s  redundant  actions,  including  use  of  a  
tool to operate an opening mechanism, even after having discovered through their 
own trial-and-error learning simpler hand operations (Nielsen et al., 2012; Nielsen & 
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Tomaselli, 2010). In both cases it seems highly unlikely that children would interpret 
the modeled actions as being causally important, and in situations where they are 
explicitly asked they will respond that such actions are indeed not necessary 
(Kenward, 2012; Kenward et al., 2011; Keupp et al., 2013). Nonetheless, we do not 
yet know how children decide if a particular action is causally necessary or not, or if 
certain kinds of actions (e.g., those involving unnecessary additional steps, inefficient 
means  or  unnecessary  styles)  are  more  ‘normative’  than  others.  Future  research  is  
needed to address this. Doing so promises to considerably illuminate our 
understanding of the overimitation phenomenon.  
   More than 5 million years of separate evolution divides us from chimpanzees, 
our closest living animal relatives. In that time we have evolved to be the highly 
overimitative species highlighted in the current experiments. Chimpanzees, on the 
other hand, do not overimitate (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Nagell, Olguin, & 
Tomasello, 1993; Nielsen & Susianto, 2011; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2006). 
Indeed it has been argued that it is not until around 1.75 million years ago when our 
hominin ancestors, including Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis, began striking 
large stone flakes and bifacially shaping stone tools to create the characteristic 
artefacts of the Acheulean industry that we see signs of a propensity for overimitation 
(Nielsen, 2012; Putt, Woods, & Franciscus, 2014; Shipton, 2010; Shipton & Nielsen, 
submitted; although see Tennie, Braun, & McPherron, in press). From this period in 
our past the range and diversity of our tool kit began increasing exponentially 
alongside increasing group size (Dunbar, 1998, 2003; Vaesen, 2012). This likely 
created two distinct but complimentary pressures: (1) The need to obtain the 
necessary skills to use and make an increasing array of tools, and (2) the need to 
identify and bond to other group members, something that is facilitated by doing as 
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others do. Overimitation serves both purposes, underscoring its emergence as a 
dominant learning process pivotal to the development of our species.  
 Rituals pervade the human condition, with astonishing variety, in ways that may 
grow communities and underpin human civilization (Jones, 2013). Here, in the 
behavior of young children we show how pervasive the inclination is to perceive 
actions as ritualistic, and adopt them as such. In a task that is novel, benign (failure 
affords no direct survival disadvantage), and minimally public (occurring in a closed 
test room with no bystanders present), young children readily reproduced actions with 
no functional valence. Their readiness to do so highlights the ease of uptake 
associated with ritualized actions and provides a window into the mechanisms by 
which they are passed from generation to generation. These experiments reveal the 
strong, early-emerging propensity of children for adopting the ritual stance. There are 
profound  and  enduring  reasons  for  them  to  do  so.  It’s  what  makes  us  human.   
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Figure 1. Mean arbitrary actions and 95% confidence intervals for each condition in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
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Figure 2. Mean causally related actions and 95% confidence intervals for each 
condition in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
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Table 1 
The puzzle boxes used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 Box 
Pictures 
Opening mechanism 
Box closed Box open 
Not 
acted 
upon 
by 
child 
Blue 
Box 
  
Small knob on front; 
hinged 
Purple 
Box 
 
 
Metal clasp in 
middle of front 
Acted 
upon 
by 
child 
Green 
Switch 
Box 
 
 
Metal  bear  ‘switch’  
pushed horizontally 
Wooden 
box 
  
Top metal loop 
pushed upwards  
   
